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“Oh, it is you, is it?”: Closing the Door on Reasonable 
Resistance to Unlawful Police Entry in Indiana 
JESSE DRUM* 
INTRODUCTION 
For over a century, Indiana residents could lawfully resist police officers who 
tried to enter their homes illegally.1 On May 12, 2011, in Barnes v. State,2 the 
Indiana Supreme Court parted from the common law and stripped Hoosiers of their 
right to reasonably resist unlawful police entries.3 The court granted a petition for 
rehearing on September 20, 2011, and “restated” its holding: Hoosiers can 
reasonably resist, but battery on a police officer is not reasonable resistance.4 Then, 
on March 20, 2012, Governor Mitch Daniels signed into law a bill “reaffirming the 
long standing right of a citizen to protect his or her home against unlawful 
intrusion.”5 Homeowners may use “reasonable force” to prevent unlawful police 
entry, but the statute does not define “reasonable force.”6  
This Note argues that the Indiana Supreme Court blocked any effective means to 
resist unlawful police home entry when it prohibited Hoosiers from resisting with 
force that would constitute battery. The Indiana General Assembly was correct to 
codify the common-law castle doctrine. But the revised statute does not remedy the 
court’s limitation of reasonable resistance because it does not define “reasonable 
force.” Without any guidance from the legislature, the level of resistance that is 
reasonable to prevent unlawful police entry will be left to the judiciary. 
The Indiana Supreme Court should abandon the Barnes rationale and adopt an 
approach more consistent with state precedent and the principles of privacy implicit 
in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution7 and article I, section 11 of the 
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 1. See State ex rel. McPheron v. Beckner, 31 N.E. 950, 952 (Ind. 1892) (“In our 
opinion the officer, in forcing an entrance into the dwelling house, was guilty of a trespass 
which rendered his subsequent acts unlawful, and justified the relatrix in resisting his further 
progress in serving the writ by force.”); Casselman v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1310, 1313–14 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1985) (citing McPheron, 31 N.E. 950. at 951–52). 
 2. 946 N.E.2d 572 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011). 
 3. Id. at 574. 
 4. Barnes v. State (Barnes II), 953 N.E.2d 473, 474–75 (Ind. 2011). 
 5. Act of Mar. 20, 2012, Pub. L. No. 161–2012, 2012 Ind. Acts 3428, 3428–31 
(codified as amended at IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2012)). 
 6. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i) (2012). 
 7. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, 
e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312–13 (1972) (“There is, 
understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used 
to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the Bill of Rights to 
safeguard this privacy. Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech 
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Indiana Constitution.8 This Note proposes an interpretation of reasonable force for 
resisting unlawful police entry. It proposes a bright-line rule for where and how 
resistance is reasonable. The goals of the legislature in revising the statute will 
most likely be met if the court draws the line for reasonable resistance at the 
doorway. 
Part I of this Note describes the Indiana Supreme Court’s first Barnes opinion 
on transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, the reactions to that ruling, the 
court’s rehearing of Barnes, and the Indiana General Assembly’s response. Part II 
argues that the Indiana Supreme Court’s definition of reasonable resistance in 
Barnes unduly infringes on the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The legislature’s response did not provide a viable solution. Part III 
outlines the history of the right to resist unlawful police action in Indiana. It traces 
the common-law right to resist unlawful entry, the right to resist unlawful arrest, 
and the distinction between resisting public arrest and private entry. These 
common-law developments provide a framework for a clearer, more effective rule 
for reasonable resistance. Part IV proposes that the court should draw the line for 
reasonable resistance at the doorway, rather than ban all “rude, insolent, or angry” 
touching of police officers acting outside the scope of their duty.9 
I. BARNES I, BARNES II, AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S RESPONSE 
Indiana case law developed to distinguish resisting unlawful arrests in public 
and unlawful entries into the home. In a case before the Indiana Court of Appeals 
in 2010,10 it was not clear whether the defendant resisted a public arrest or a home 
entry. The case was an opportunity to reconcile the two trajectories in the case law. 
The courts made three attempts: one by the Indiana Court of Appeals and two by 
the Indiana Supreme Court. The Indiana General Assembly responded by amending 
the defense of property statute. Now the courts will be charged with interpreting the 
revised statute.  
                                                                                                                 
from unreasonable surveillance.”) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).  
 8. The language of article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution is nearly identical to 
that of the Fourth Amendment . See IND. CONST. art. 1, § 11.  
 9. See IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(a) (2012). The statute reads as follows: 
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, 
insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However, 
the offense is:  
(1) a Class A misdemeanor if . . .  
(B) it is committed against a law enforcement officer or against a person 
summoned and directed by the officer while the officer is engaged in the 
execution of the officer’s official duty . . .  
(2) a Class D felony if it results in bodily injury to:  
(A) a law enforcement officer or a person summoned and directed by a law 
enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in the execution of the 
officer’s official duty. 
 10. Barnes v. State, 925 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. App. 2010), vacated, 946 N.E.2d 572 (Ind.), 
aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011). 
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A. Barnes I 
The facts before the Indiana Court of Appeals in Barnes v. State11 were 
unremarkable. Officers responding to a “domestic violence in progress call”12 saw 
Richard Barnes leaving his apartment with a bag.13 Barnes became agitated when 
an officer questioned him, and he told the officer that he was leaving, so the officer 
was not needed.14 One officer warned Barnes, who was by this time yelling, that he 
would be arrested for disorderly conduct if he did not calm down.15 Barnes 
answered, “if you lock me up for disorderly conduct, you’re going to be sitting 
right next to me in a jail cell.”16 
Barnes’s wife came to the parking lot with more of his things.17 The officers 
tried to follow Barnes and his wife back into the apartment.18 At the doorway, 
Barnes told the officers that they could not enter.19 Although she did not invite the 
officers in, Barnes’s wife told Barnes, “[d]on’t do this,” and, “[w]hy don’t you let 
them in.”20 The police tried to enter: 
When Officer Reed attempted to walk past Barnes to enter the 
apartment, Barnes shoved the officer into the hallway. Officer Reed and 
Barnes continued to struggle and eventually the other officer on the 
scene grabbed Barnes in a vascular neck restraint and took Barnes to 
the ground. Barnes continued to struggle and a taser was used to subdue 
Barnes. Barnes suffered an adverse reaction to the taser and was 
transported to the hospital.21 
The State of Indiana charged Barnes with battery on a law enforcement officer 
and resisting law enforcement.22 The trial court refused Barnes’s request for a jury 
instruction on the right to reasonably resist unlawful entry into the home,23 and the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. 925 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. App. 2010), vacated, 946 N.E.2d 572 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 
953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011). 
 12. Barnes v. State (Barnes I), 946 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 
473 (Ind. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Barnes’s wife told the dispatcher that 
Barnes did not hit her, but he did throw her phone against the wall. Id. 
 13. Barnes, 925 N.E.2d at 423. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 427 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17. Id. at 423.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. Barnes was also charged with disorderly conduct and interference with the 
reporting of a crime, id., but those charges are not relevant to this Note. 
 23. Id. at 424. Barnes requested the following jury instruction: “When an arrest is 
attempted by means of a forceful and unlawful entry into a citizen’s home, such entry 
represents the use of excessive force, and the arrest cannot be considered peaceable. 
Therefore, a citizen has the right to reasonably resist the unlawful entry.” Id. 
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jury found Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer and resisting law 
enforcement.24 
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Barnes’s conviction.25 
The court, citing Robinson v. State,26 agreed that Barnes’s proposed jury instruction 
should have been given because it was a correct statement of the law.27 Because 
there were neither exigent circumstances nor consent, the officer’s attempt to enter 
Barnes’s apartment was unlawful.28 Although Robinson held that “[t]he right to 
reasonably resist an unlawful entry does not include the right to commit a battery 
upon a police officer,”29 the Barnes court noted that “there can be a fine line 
between reasonable resistance and battery, but that is for the jury to resolve.”30 
Therefore, because the jury could have concluded that Barnes’s resistance was 
reasonable, the court found that the failure to give the jury instruction was not 
harmless error.31 
On transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed.32 The court held that “the right 
to reasonably resist an unlawful police entry into a home is no longer recognized 
under Indiana law.”33 Although Indiana courts have acknowledged that a different 
analysis applies to resisting arrest outside the home than to resisting police entry 
into the home,34 the court found that “a right to resist an unlawful police entry into 
a home is against public policy and is incompatible with modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence”35 for the same reasons given in earlier cases abrogating 
the right to resist public arrests.36 The court found the right to resist unlawful entry 
contravenes public policy for three reasons: first, citizens have means of redress 
unavailable at common law; second, resistance escalates the risk of injury to the 
parties involved; and third, warrants are not necessary for every police entry.37 
Two justices dissented. Justice Dickson found the majority’s holding 
unnecessarily broad:  
It would have been preferable, in my view, for the Court today to have 
taken a more narrow approach, construing the right to resist unlawful 
police entry, which extends only to reasonable resistance, by deeming 
unreasonable a person’s resistance to police entry in the course of 
investigating reports of domestic violence. Such a formulation would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Id. at 423. 
 25. Id. 
 26. 814 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). See generally infra Part III.D–E. 
 27. Barnes, 925 N.E.2d at 424. 
 28. Id. at 425. 
 29. Robinson, 814 N.E.2d at 708. 
 30. Barnes, 925 N.E.2d at 426 (quoting Robinson, 814 N.E.2d at 709) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Barnes v. State (Barnes I), 946 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 
473 (Ind. 2011). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 576 (discussing Casselman v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1310, 1315–18 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1985)). See generally infra Part III. 
 35. Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 576. 
 36. See, e.g., Fields v. State, 382 N.E.2d 972, 975–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). 
 37. Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 576. 
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have been more appropriate for the facts presented and more consistent 
with principles of judicial restraint. Such a more cautious revision of 
the common law would have, in cases not involving domestic violence, 
left in place the historic right of people to reasonably resist unlawful 
police entry into their dwellings.38 
Justice Rucker also found the majority’s opinion too broad but acknowledged 
the different policy rationales for resisting arrest in public and resisting entry into 
the home.39 Justice Rucker wrote that “the common law rule supporting a citizen’s 
right to resist unlawful entry into her home rests on a very different ground, 
namely, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”40 For Justice 
Rucker, the  
issue in this case [was] not whether Barnes had the right to resist 
unlawful police entry into his home—a proposition that the State [did] 
not even contest—but rather whether the entry was illegal in the first 
place, and if so, whether and to what extent Barnes could resist entry 
without committing a battery upon the officer.41  
For support, Justice Rucker cited the U.S. Supreme Court cases Payton v. New 
York and Miller v. United States.42 
B. The Aftermath of Barnes I 
The public responded to the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision with outrage.43 
Citizens made threatening phone calls and sent e-mails to the judiciary and law 
enforcement.44 Citizens staged a Fourth Amendment rally at the Statehouse45 and 
created a Facebook page to discuss it.46 The case, which was mostly regarded as an 
attack on Fourth Amendment rights,47 also provided material for discussion outside 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Id. at 579 (Dickson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 39. Id. at 579–80 (Rucker, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 580. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (“Indeed, ‘the physical 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.’”); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)). 
 43. See, e.g., Dan Carden, Outrage Leading to Action Against Ind. Supreme Court 
Ruling, TIMES OF NORTHWEST IND., (May 18, 2011, 6:15 PM), 
http://www.nwitimes.com/news/state-and-regional/indiana/article_988ef0c9-bcd1-5683-
8a62-fd7062aa1a78.html. 
 44. See Marcia Oddi, Indiana State Bar Association Releases Statement on Barnes 
Decision, IND. L. BLOG (May 20, 2011, 10:26 AM), 
http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2011/05/ind_decisions_i_105.html. 
 45. See Nikki Kelly, Justices Asked to Review Ruling: Attorney General Opposes 
Decision on Police Searches, J. GAZETTE, May 21, 2011, at 1C; Indiana Citizens Take Back 
4th Amendment, RTR.ORG (May 26, 2011), http://rtr.org/pages/indiana-rally-live. 
 46. Stand Up for Your Fourth Amendment Rights, FACEBOOK (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.facebook.com/events/190100751036509/. 
 47. See, e.g., Thomas R. Eddlem, Indiana Supreme Court Says Citizens Can’t Resist 
Rogue Police, NEW AM. (May 16, 2011, 1:00 AM), 
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of Indiana.48 The Indianapolis Bar Association issued a press release defending the 
decision while also presciently reminding the public that this might not be the final 
word on the case.49 
In addition to (or perhaps in response to) the public outcry following Barnes I, 
both parties and amici curiae filed petitions for rehearing. In his brief, Barnes 
argued that the Indiana Supreme Court ruling abrogated the Fourth Amendment, 
essentially giving police officers free reign to enter any residence without a 
warrant.50 The State argued in its brief that the court’s holding was unnecessarily 
broad.51 According to the State, it was not necessary to completely abolish the 
common-law right to reasonably resist, and the court should narrow its opinion to 
hold that reasonable resistance does not include battery against a police officer.52 
As amici, members of the Indiana General Assembly filed a brief requesting a 
narrowed holding consistent with “Indiana’s robust self-defense statute.”53 The 
congressmen noted the difference between the right to resist unlawful arrest in the 
street and the right to resist unlawful police entry in the home and argued that 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/7959-indiana-supreme-court-
says-citizens-cant-resist-rogue-police; Mark Kiesling, Indiana High Court Moves Another 
Step Toward Fascism, TIMES OF NORTHWEST IND., (May 15, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.nwitimes.com/news/opinion/columnists/mark-kiesling/article_3e36c0f8-59fa-
5ceb-9e8e-80ee1a12ef66.html. 
 48. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Police Now Have Unprecedented Power to Invade Our 
Home, CATO INST. (May 28, 2011), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/police-
now-have-unprecedented-power-invade-our-home; Orin Kerr, No Right to Assault Police 
Officer Entering Home Even If Entrance Is Unlawful, Indiana Supreme Court Holds, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2011, 12:44 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/05/13/no-right-to-
assault-police-officer-entering-home-even-if-entrance-is-unlawful-indiana-supreme-court-
holds/. 
 49. Press Release, Indianapolis Bar Association, Indianapolis Bar Association Responds 
to Criticism of Marion County Circuit Court Judge (May 24, 2011), available at 
http://www.indybar.org/news/pressroom.php/2011/11. 
 50. Petition for Rehearing at 1–4, Barnes v. State (Barnes II), 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 
2011) (No. 82S05-1007-CR-343). Barnes also argued that the court’s holding was an ex post 
facto punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
disorderly conduct conviction was a First Amendment violation, id. at 4–8, but this Note is 
not concerned with those arguments. 
 51. See State’s Brief in Response to Petition for Rehearing at 2, Barnes II, 953 N.E.2d 
473 (Ind. 2011) (No. 82S05-1007-CR-343). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Brief of Amici Curiae Senators M. Young, Long, Alting, Banks, Becker, Boots, 
Bray, Buck, Charbonneau, Delph, Eckerty, Gard, Glick, Grooms, Head, Hershman, 
Holdman, Hume, Kruse, Landske, Lawson, Leising, Merritt, Miller, Mrvan, Nugent, Paul, 
Randloph, Schneider, Smith, Steele, Taylor, Tomes, Walker, Waltz, Waterman, Wyss, 
Yoder, R. Young, Zakas, and Representatives Behning, Brown, Burton, Cheatham, Cherry, 
Culver, Davis, Dembowksi, Dermondy, Dodge, Eberhart, Ellspermann, Foley, Friend, 
Heaton, Hinkle, Kersey, Klinker, Koch, Leonard, Mahan, Morris, Moses, Neese, Rhoads, 
Saunders, Speedy, Torr, Turner, Tyler, and Wolkinsin Support of Appellant’s Petition for 
Rehearing at 2–3, Barnes II, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011) (No. 82S05-1007-CR-343) (citing 
IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2006) (“(b) A person: (1) is justified in using reasonable force, 
including deadly force, against another person; and (2) does not have a duty to retreat; if the 
person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other 
person’s unlawful entry of or attack on the person’s dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor 
vehicle.”) (emphasis omitted)). 
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public policy favored the right to reasonably resist entry into the home.54 Finally, 
criminal law and procedure scholars filed a brief as amici.55 The professors focused 
on the common-law right and argued that public policy should encourage citizens 
to resist unlawful police entry because the harm to society from civil rights 
violations is worse than the potential harm to the officers.56 
C. Barnes II 
On rehearing, in Barnes v. State (Barnes II),57 the Indiana Supreme Court agreed 
with the State.58 In Barnes I, the court addressed “the question of whether Indiana 
should recognize the common-law right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by 
police officers.”59 To that common-law question, the court unequivocally answered 
no.60 In Barnes II, the court rephrased the “central question” it addressed in Barnes 
I to “whether the defendant was entitled to have the jury told that the common law 
right to defend one’s home against invasion was a defense against Indiana’s statute 
that criminalizes violence against police officers acting in the course of their 
duties.”61 The court answered this narrow statutory question by holding that “the 
Castle Doctrine is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a 
police officer.”62  
The Indiana Supreme Court did not address its Barnes I reasoning for abolishing 
the right to resist unlawful entry. The court’s reasoning for restating its “essential 
holding” was limited to the State’s interpretation of what the “central thesis” should 
have been and “bring[ing] Indiana common law in stride with jurisdictions that 
value promoting safety in situations where police and homeowners interact.”63 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Id. at 4–5. 
 55. Brief of John Wesley Hall, K. Babe Howell, Eric Rasmusen, Steven Russell, and 
Ronald S. Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing, Barnes 
II, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011) (No. 82S05-1007-CR-343). 
 56. Id. at 8–9. 
 57. 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011). 
 58. Id. at 474. The court agreed with the State so much, in fact, that it misinterpreted its 
own prior holding. Compare id. (“We deem the Attorney General to have restated the central 
thesis of our resolution of this case.”), and id. (“Neither the trial court, nor the Court of 
Appeals, nor this Court have agreed with Barnes that the officers violated any statute or any 
provision of the state or federal constitutions when they sought entry, at the wife’s request, 
to investigate and ensure the wife’s safety.”) (emphasis added), with Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d 
572, 574 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011) (“Mary did not explicitly invite 
the officers in, but she told Barnes several times, ‘don’t do this’ and ‘just let them in.’”). 
Even if Mary had invited the officers in, the United States Supreme Court in Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106, 122–23 (2006), held that, absent an exigent circumstance, 
police may not enter a dwelling when one spouse consents and the other refuses. Here, it 
would have been easy for the Indiana Supreme Court to find that there was an exigent 
circumstance because police were responding to possible domestic violence. 
 59. Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 575. 
 60. Id. at 577 (“[W]e hold that [in] Indiana the right to reasonably resist an unlawful 
police entry into a home is no longer recognized under Indiana law.”). 
 61. Barnes II, 953 N.E.2d at 474. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 474–75. 
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Justice Dickson, who dissented in Barnes I because the court’s opinion was 
unnecessarily broad,64 concurred only in the result. Justice Rucker dissented again. 
While he agreed rehearing was warranted, Justice Rucker believed there was 
tension between the battery on a police officer statute65 and the resistance with 
reasonable force statute.66 Justice Rucker “would grant rehearing to explore 
whether, as a matter of Indiana statutory law, defendant Barnes was entitled to a 
jury instruction regarding police entry into his home.”67 
D. The General Assembly Responds 
In response to Barnes I, the Indiana General Assembly created the “Barnes v. 
State Subcommittee.”68 The subcommittee recommended a revised version of the 
defense of person or property statute to the general assembly.69 Governor Mitch 
Daniels signed the bill into law on March 20, 2012.70 
The previous statute did not specifically provide a defense for force used to 
prevent unlawful action by police officers.71 The revised version does. It provides, 
in relevant part: 
(i) A person is justified in using reasonable force against a public 
servant72 if the person reasonably believes force is necessary to: 
(1) protect the person or a third person from what the person 
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force; 
(2) prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful entry of or 
attack on the person’s dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor 
vehicle; or 
(3) prevent or terminate the public servant’s unlawful trespass on or 
criminal interference with property lawfully in the person’s 
possession, lawfully in possession of a member of the person’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. See Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 579 (Dickson, J., dissenting). 
 65. Barnes II, 953 N.E.2d at 475 (Rucker, J., dissenting) (citing IND. CODE § 35-42-2-
1(a)(1)(B) (2010)). 
 66. Id. (Rucker, J., dissenting) (citing IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(b) (2010)). 
 67. Id. (Rucker, J., dissenting). 
 68. See Final Report of the Legislative Council Barnes v. State Subcommittee, 2011 
Sess. (Ind. 2011), http://www.in.gov/legislative/interim/committee/lcbs.html. 
 69. Id.  
 70. See Press Release, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels, Governor Signs SEA 1; Final 
2012 Bill Watch Update (Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Daniels Press Release], 
http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=54715&inf
ormation_id=109805&type=&syndicate=syndicate. 
 71. See IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2 (2010). In his Barnes II dissent, Justice Rucker noted the 
tension between the battery on a police officer statute, section 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(B), and the 
previous version of section 35-41-3-2(b). Barnes II, 953 N.E.2d at 475 (Rucker, J., 
dissenting). 
 72. “Public servant” is defined in Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-261 (2012), in 
relevant part, as “a person who: (1) is authorized to perform an official function on behalf of, 
and is paid by, a governmental entity . . . .”  
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immediate family, or belonging to a person whose property the 
person has authority to protect.73 
The statute also allows for the use of deadly force against an officer if a two-part 
test is met: 
(k) A person is not justified in using deadly force against a public 
servant whom the person knows or reasonably should know is a public 
servant unless: 
 (1) the person reasonably believes that the public servant is: 
  (A) acting unlawfully; or 
(B) not engaged in the execution of the public servant’s official 
duties; and 
(2) the force is reasonably necessary to prevent serious bodily injury 
to the person or a third person.74 
In the revised statute, the general assembly “declare[d] that it is the policy of 
this state to recognize the unique character of a citizen’s home” and sought “to 
ensure that a citizen feels secure in his or her own home against unlawful intrusion 
by another individual or a public servant.”75 In a press release after he signed the 
bill into law, Governor Daniels declared that the law protects police officers 
because it “narrow[s] the situations in which someone would be justified in using 
force against them.”76 Daniels continued, “Moreover, unless a person is convinced 
an officer is acting unlawfully, he cannot use any force of any kind. In the real 
world, there will almost never be a situation in which these extremely narrow 
conditions are met.”77 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF BARNES 
The central question the Indiana Supreme Court addressed in Barnes I was the 
efficacy of the common-law right to resist unlawful entry by police officers.78 It 
followed from the court’s holding that if “the right to reasonably resist an unlawful 
police entry into a home is no longer recognized under Indiana law,”79 then “Barnes 
is not entitled to batter [Officer] Reed, irrespective as to the legality of Reed’s 
entry.”80 In Barnes II, the court ignored its common-law discussion and focused 
instead on the defenses against battery on an officer:81 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i) (2012). 
 74. § 35-41-3-2(k). 
 75. § 35-41-3-2(a). 
 76. Daniels Press Release, supra note 70. 
 77. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 78. Barnes v. State (Barnes I), 946 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 
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 We also emphasize that this holding does not alter, indeed says 
nothing, about the statutory and constitutional boundaries of legal entry 
into the home or any other place. Our earlier opinion was not intended 
to, and did not, change that existing law about the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, and papers against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
 
 This also reflects the basis for our holding about defenses available 
to criminal defendants charged with violence against police officers: 
the ruling is statutory and not constitutional. The General Assembly can 
and does create statutory defenses to the offenses it criminalizes, and 
the crime of battery against a police officer stands on no different 
ground. What the statutory defenses should be, if any, is in its hands.82 
The court punted the question to the legislature, leaving everyone guessing as to 
the status of the common-law right to resist unlawful entries by police officers. The 
legislature fielded the court’s punt but then fumbled back to the court without 
addressing an important question. 
A. Unanswered Questions 
Rather than sweep a century of common law under the rug, the Indiana Supreme 
Court should have directly addressed whether a citizen can resist in the scenario 
that Barnes resisted. That is, when the police meet a suspect outside of his 
dwelling, can the suspect go into his residence and use force to keep the police 
out?83 And if the homeowner can use force to keep the police out, how much force 
can he use?  
The Indiana Court of Appeals found that Barnes’s proposed jury instruction 
about a citizen’s right to reasonably resist was a correct statement of the law.84 
Barnes I changed the existing law as the court of appeals found it and held that no 
resistance is reasonable in any scenario.85 Then, on rehearing, Barnes II held that 
the castle doctrine is not a defense to the crime of battery on a police officer: 
Hoosiers might still be able to reasonably resist, but battery against a police officer 
is not reasonable resistance.  
The Indiana General Assembly did not alter the Barnes II holding when it 
revised the defense of property statute. The revised statute provides that a person 
may use reasonable force against a police officer to prevent what the person 
reasonably believes is an unlawful entry.86 The statute allows for the use of deadly 
force in limited circumstances,87 but someone in Barnes’s situation would never be 
justified in using deadly force against the police because deadly force was not 
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to anyone. 
                                                                                                                 
that the common-law right to defend one’s home against invasion was a defense against 
Indiana’s statute that criminalizes violence against police officers acting in the course of 
their duties.”). 
 82. Id. at 474–75 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IND. CONST. art. I, § 11). 
 83. See Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 574. 
 84. Barnes v. State, 925 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 85. Barnes I, 946 N.E.2d at 577. 
 86. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i) (2012). 
 87. § 35-41-3-2(k). 
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The Indiana courts will soon be tasked with interpreting what the legislature 
meant by “reasonable force” because the legislature did not provide a definition. 
Without a clear definition of reasonable force, homeowners will decide not only 
whether the police are acting unlawfully, but also how much force they think is 
reasonable. This could lead to unnecessary violence that exceeds the batteries that 
are common in cases where police and homeowners meet at the door.88 
B. Reasonable Resistance Without Battery 
The Indiana Supreme Court should not have drawn the line of reasonable 
resistance at battery because citizens cannot reasonably resist unlawful police entry 
into their homes without committing battery. To prove a battery on a police officer, 
the State must only demonstrate that the defendant knowingly or intentionally 
touched the officer rudely, insolently, or angrily.89 As the professors noted in their 
amicus brief for rehearing, battery is one of the easiest crimes to fabricate.90 There 
is no tangible evidence for battery that does not amount to visible physical injury, 
and when the alleged crime occurs at the doorway of a private residence, there are 
often no witnesses.91 When an officer acting without a warrant knocks on a door 
and his knock is answered, he may simply insert his foot into the doorway and wait 
for the resident to commit the battery of closing the door on it.92 When the resident 
closes the door on the officer’s foot—commits a misdemeanor in the officer’s 
presence—the officer can make an arrest.93 
The only way to reasonably resist an unlawful police home entry without using 
force is to not open the door when the police knock. Even notwithstanding recent 
United States Supreme Court precedent that might turn not answering the door into 
an exigent circumstance and cause for warrantless entry,94 a closed door is false 
security against unwelcome invasion of privacy. As Judge Posner observed in 
Hadley v. Williams95: 
Since few people will refuse to open the door to the police, the effect of 
the rule of [the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals that when a 
person answers a police knock, the police can seize anything they see 
under the plain view doctrine] is to undermine, for no good reason that 
we can see, the [Payton] principle that a warrant is required for entry 
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 89. § 35-42-2-1. 
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into the home, in the absence of consent or compelling circumstances. 
Those cases equate knowledge (what the officer obtains from the plain 
view) with a right to enter, and by doing so permit the rule of Payton to 
be evaded.96 
The Indiana Supreme Court recognized the likelihood that citizens will open 
their doors to the police in Cox v. State97: “Opening the door to ascertain the 
purpose of an interruption to the private enjoyment of the home is not an invitation 
to enter, but rather is a common courtesy of civilized society.”98 The court also 
recognized that homeowners who open their doors have certain privileges: 
“Attendant to this courtesy is the ability to exclude those who are knocking and 
preserve the integrity of the physical boundaries of the home.”99 The Barnes rule 
limits the ability of Hoosiers who open their doors from excluding the police when 
the police make it impracticable to close the door once it is opened. The rule 
effectively makes opening the door an invitation for police to enter or overstay their 
welcome.100 Once the police enter, the remedies for invasion of privacy are scant. 
C. An Ineffective Exclusionary Rule 
There is, of course, an exclusionary rule, which the United States Supreme 
Court applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,101 to exclude evidence that was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from a defendant’s trial.102 The 
Indiana Supreme Court actually adopted an exclusionary rule before Mapp made it 
mandatory in the 1923 case Callender v. State.103 In Callender, the court held that 
“[i]f the property was secured by search and seizure under the pretext of a search 
warrant, which was invalid for any reason, then the property so seized could not be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Id. at 750. 
 97. 696 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. 1998). 
 98. Id. at 858. 
 99. Id. (citing United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 100. Some might argue that little is to be gained from a standoff at the doorway. But, as 
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outside an open door:  
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Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099, 1109 
(2009). 
 101. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 102. For a description of § 1983 civil remedies for violations of constitutional rights, see 
generally Tyler Anderson, Note, Balancing the Scales: Reinstating Home Privacy Without 
Violence in Indiana, 88 IND. L.J 361, 382–88 (2013). 
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U.S. 897 (1984). See IND. CODE § 35-37-4-5 (2012) (effective 1983). 
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used as evidence against the appellant, and its admission over his objection was 
prejudicial error.”104  
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.105 But if the 
police are not deterred by the risk of evidence being excluded at trial, the 
exclusionary rule cannot adequately protect the dweller’s privacy interest. As the 
Indiana Supreme Court observed in Pirtle v. State106: 
In suppressing evidence which is material and relevant, but which is 
obtained by the exploitation of constitutionally prohibited police 
conduct, the courts are attempting to deter the proscribed conduct by 
making it unprofitable. In regard to the Fourth Amendment, the illegal 
conduct is the initial invasion of the privacy of a person or his property. 
No subsequent exclusion of evidence will restore that privacy. 
However, the courts have determined that, at the least, the Government 
should not have the advantage of its wrong in a case against the person 
whose privacy was invaded.107 
The Barnes rule actually encourages police misconduct because it gives officers 
another tool to enter a person’s home without a warrant. It weakens the already frail 
exclusionary rule by working against it. 
D. The Privacy Interest 
Implicit in the Fourth Amendment is the right of citizens to enjoy privacy in 
their homes.108 In Johnson v. United States,109 Justice Jackson famously stated: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any 
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s 
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the 
officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in 
the discretion of police officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one’s 
own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law 
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allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of 
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not 
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of 
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be 
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government 
enforcement agent.110 
When the Supreme Court held in Payton v. New York111 that routine felony 
arrests inside the suspect’s home were unconstitutional without a warrant or 
consent, privacy was the Court’s central concern.112 Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, asserted that “the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”113 The Court renounced 
any substantial difference in entering a home to search for property and entering a 
home to search for a person: 
The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of 
the entrance to an individual’s home. The Fourth Amendment protects 
the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of 
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous 
physical dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its 
roots in clear and specific constitutional terms . . . . In terms that apply 
equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth 
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent 
exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed 
without a warrant.114 
The Court also evaluated the common law at the time the Framers adopted the 
Fourth Amendment to determine that no definitive source existed that allowed 
warrantless entries without exigent circumstances.115 The Court gathered from the 
common-law sources “a sensitivity to privacy interests that could not have been 
lost on the Framers.”116 The privacy interests were clear in “[t]he zealous and 
frequent repetition of the adage that a ‘man’s house is his castle.’”117 
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III. THE COMMON-LAW RIGHT TO RESIST UNLAWFUL POLICE ENTRY IN INDIANA  
The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the common-law castle doctrine at the close 
of the nineteenth century.118 From its early common-law roots, the Indiana 
appellate courts developed two branches of precedent: resisting unlawful public 
arrests and resisting unlawful home entries by police. The Indiana Supreme Court 
recognized the right to resist unlawful public arrests in 1972,119 but then the Indiana 
Court of Appeals abandoned it in 1978.120 Then the courts considered the policies 
for maintaining the right to resist unlawful home entries by police, including the 
issue of how much resistance is reasonable. The Barnes cases presented an 
opportunity for the court to reconcile resisting unlawful public arrest with resisting 
unlawful home entry. 
A. Recognizing the Right to Resist Unlawful Police Entry 
The first case to recognize the common-law right to resist unlawful police entry 
in Indiana, State ex rel. McPheron v. Beckner,121 resolved a dispute over a sewing 
machine. In an action in replevin for the sewing machine, the constable visited the 
residence of the owner of the machine, but the owner was not home.122 The owner’s 
mother let the constable in to view the machine, but he left without taking it.123 He 
returned and rang the doorbell later that afternoon.124 
The relatrix, upon going to said door, opened it a few inches, when said 
Beckner, upon said door being so opened, slipped his cane in, and the 
relatrix thereupon said, “Oh, it is you, is it?” and immediately, and 
before the said Beckner had entered, or partly entered, said dwelling 
house, attempted, by leaning and pushing against the said door, to close 
the same, and to keep said Beckner from entering said dwelling; that 
said Beckner called to his associates to come, and then and there . . . 
pushed with great force on said outer door of said dwelling house, and 
forced the same open, against the will and power of said relatrix, who 
was thereby thrown back on a banister near said door, and injured. 
After the officer had gained an entrance into the dwelling he proceeded 
to execute the command of his writ, the relatrix resisting him at every 
step. During the struggle the relatrix received further injuries.125 
The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the castle doctrine: “Except as modified by 
statute . . . every man’s house is to be treated as his castle, and kept sacred from 
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forcible intrusion . . . .”126 The officer trespassed, and therefore the mother was 
justified in resisting with force.127 
For over a century following Indiana’s adoption of the castle doctrine, no one 
challenged the right to resist unlawful police entry in Indiana’s appellate courts. 
The right was not tested until 1985, when the Indiana Court of Appeals decided in 
Casselman v. State128 that the defendant could resist the unlawful entry by an 
officer because the officer’s entry was excessive force.129 Before that, however, the 
Indiana appellate courts considered the related question of whether citizens could 
resist unlawful arrests in public places.  
B. The Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest 
The Indiana Supreme Court recognized the right to resist unlawful public arrests 
with hesitation. Only six years after recognizing the right, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals decided  the policy that favored resisting arrests in public was outdated in 
modern society. 
1. Recognizing the Right to Resist Public Arrest 
The Indiana Supreme Court discussed the right to resist unlawful public arrests 
in Heichelbech v. State.130 Heichelbech used his mother as a shield to resist his 
arrest after an officer saw him driving while allegedly intoxicated and conducted 
field sobriety tests that confirmed his suspicion.131 The court noted that “[t]he 
defendant was entitled to resist the arrest, only if the officer had no right to arrest; 
and recent cases have held that even then he may, nevertheless, not be entitled to 
use force.”132 Because Heichelbech’s arrest was lawful, the court did not expand on 
when the defendant would be entitled to use force.133 
The Indiana Court of Appeals resolved the question of when a defendant is 
entitled to use force to resist unlawful arrest in Williams v. State.134 In that case, 
after being civilly arrested by a bartender, the defendant resisted the police officers 
who tried to take him into custody.135 The court cited Heichelbech as support for 
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the defendant’s common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest.136 However, the 
court held that the degree of force used by the arrestee must be proportionate to the 
force used by the arresting officers.137 Because the officers only used physical 
restraint against the defendant, the defendant used excessive force when he 
discharged the officer’s pistol.138 The court then provided: “Moreover, recent cases 
have held that a private citizen may not use force in resisting a peaceful arrest by an 
individual who he knows, or has reason to know, is a police officer performing his 
duties regardless of whether the arrest in question is lawful or unlawful.”139  
2. Revoking the Right to Resist Public Arrest 
In light of the dicta in Heichelbech and Williams, it was not surprising that the 
Indiana Court of Appeals renounced the right to resist unlawful public arrest four 
years later in Fields v. State.140 In Fields, a police officer attempted to arrest the 
defendant for trying to move the defendant’s truck from the street with his own 
wrecker after the officer called a tow truck to have the defendant’s truck 
removed.141 The arrest was unlawful because the defendant had a statutory right to 
move his illegally parked truck himself.142 The defendant latched on to his truck’s 
towing cable, and it took mace and three officers to subdue him.143 Although the 
arrest was unlawful, the court held for the first time that a private citizen may not 
use force to resist a public arrest, regardless of the legality of the arrest.144 The 
court reasoned: 
We are of the opinion that the common law rule is outmoded in our 
modern society. A citizen, today, can seek his remedy for a policeman’s 
unwarranted and illegal intrusion into the citizen’s private affairs by 
bringing a civil action in the courts against the police officer and the 
governmental unit which the officer represents. The common law right 
of forceful resistance to an unlawful arrest tends to promote violence 
and increases the chances of someone getting injured or killed.145 
Although only four years had passed since the Indiana Court of Appeals 
officially adopted the common-law right to resist unlawful arrest, the court 
distinguished modern society from the time when the common-law rule was 
developed: “[It] was developed largely during a period when most arrests were 
made by private citizens, when bail for felonies was usually unattainable, and when 
years might pass before the royal judges arrived for jail delivery.”146 The court also 
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noted that “conditions in English jails were then such that a prisoner had an 
excellent chance of dying of disease before trial.”147 
C. Distinguishing the Right to Resist Unlawful Public Arrests from the Right to 
Resist Unlawful Home Entries 
The Indiana courts distinguished resisting unlawful public arrests from resisting 
unlawful police home entries. Two main reasons emerged from the case law for 
why different policies supported allowing citizens to resist entry into their homes 
but not arrests in public. First, the means used to make the arrest can make an entry 
into the home illegal. Second, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
makes the home a special place. 
1. The Means Used to Make an Arrest 
In Casselman v. State,148 the Indiana Court of Appeals distinguished an arrest in 
the defendant’s home from the public arrests at issue in Williams and Fields. The 
defendant in Casselman filed for bankruptcy, but he did not inform the court 
hearing a lawsuit against him about an automatic stay.149 When the defendant twice 
failed to appear at civil hearings, the court ordered the sheriff to take the defendant 
into custody for contempt.150 When a police officer arrived at the defendant’s 
residence to serve the writ of contempt, the defendant told the officer about the 
bankruptcy, but the officer began to read the writ over the defendant’s 
protestations: 
When Wofford continued to read, Casselman tried to close the door. 
Wofford reached for the door to try to stop him from closing it. 
Casselman pushed Wofford away but Wofford grabbed the door again, 
reached in, stuck [his] left front leg in to try to keep the door open. 
After a shoving and grabbing match, Casselman retreated into his 
house. Wofford followed, drew his service revolver, pointed it at 
Casselman and instructed him to “freeze.” Wofford then took 
Casselman into custody.151 
Casselman was convicted of resisting law enforcement.152 
The Indiana Court of Appeals correctly distinguished the “modern rule” applied 
to the public arrests in Williams and Fields from the common-law rule for resisting 
unlawful home entries like that in McPheron. In the earlier cases, “[t]he 
unlawfulness of the arrests arose from the absence of sufficient grounds for the 
arrests, not from the means used to effect the arrest.”153 Because the modern rule 
was not “intended as a blanket prohibition so as to criminalize any conduct 
                                                                                                                 
28 VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147. Id. 
 148. 472 N.E.2d 1310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). 
 149. Id. at 1311. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 1312 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1315. 
2013] CLOSING THE DOOR 411 
 
evincing resistance where the means used to effect an arrest are unlawful . . . . [A] 
citizen might rightfully resist the use of excessive force by one attempting to make 
an arrest.”154 The court considered the officer’s unlawful entry into the defendant’s 
home to be excessive force.155 Although Williams and Fields revoked the right to 
resist peaceful arrests in public places, after Casselman, the common-law right to 
resist unlawful police entry into the home for civil arrests still applied in Indiana.156  
2. The Sanctity of the Home 
Thirteen years later, the Indiana Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of “threshold arrests” in Cox v. State.157 In Cox, the police had probable cause to 
believe that the defendant committed murder, but they did not obtain an arrest 
warrant.158 When the police knocked on the defendant’s door, the defendant opened 
it but left the screen door closed: “When the officers asked him to come with them 
he attempted to shut the front door but an officer opened the screen door, blocked 
the front door, reached inside the house, and pulled Cox out by the arm.”159 The 
defendant then made incriminating statements at the police station.160 The court 
held that even if the entry was unlawful, the statements could not be excluded 
because the statements were made outside of the defendant’s home.161 
Without actually resolving the “threshold arrest” question,162 the court in Cox 
discussed United States v. Santana and Payton v. New York.163 In Santana, the 
police had information that the suspect sold heroin to an undercover agent.164 When 
officers arrived at the suspect’s house, she was standing in her doorway holding a 
paper bag.165 The suspect fled into her house followed by the officers.166 The Court 
held that the suspect could not defeat a proper arrest that began in a public place by 
retreating into her home.167 
Payton decided two New York cases. In the first, the police had probable cause 
to believe that Payton had committed murder.168 The officers went to Payton’s 
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apartment without a warrant.169 When no one answered the door, the officers broke 
it open and entered the apartment.170 Once inside, the officers saw a shell casing in 
plain view that was later used as evidence in Payton’s murder trial.171 In the second 
case, the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant, Riddick, had 
committed two armed robberies, but they also did not get a warrant.172 When 
Riddick’s son answered the door, the police could see Riddick sitting inside.173 
They entered his house and arrested him.174 The Court held that the police may not 
enter a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest without a warrant or 
consent.175 
The Indiana Supreme Court in Cox did not accept that Santana established that 
the threshold of the home is always a Fourth Amendment public place.176 The court 
declared, “[t]here is no question that police are required by the federal constitution 
to obtain a warrant to arrest a suspect who hunkers down inside his home and 
refuses to leave or answer the door.”177 According to the court, when applied to 
knock and arrest cases, Payton “means only that a suspect may hunker down from 
the threshold of the home as well as the interior.”178 The court refrained from ruling 
on the “interesting issue” of whether a warrant is required for a suspect who refuses 
police entry after they knock on the door.179 
The Indiana Court of Appeals applied the Casselman and Cox reasoning to 
distinguish the rule for public arrests from the rule for criminal arrests inside the 
home in Adkisson v. State.180 The police in Adkisson knocked on the defendant’s 
door after they received complaints from the neighbors about an alleged 
disturbance that left two neighbors injured.181 The defendant refused the officers’ 
request to enter her apartment, so the officers questioned her from outside the open 
door.182 When the defendant tried to cut off the inquiries by closing her door, an 
officer stuck his foot in the doorway, preventing her from closing it.183 The officer 
then informed the defendant that she was being arrested for battery,184 and he 
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followed the defendant into her apartment.185 A struggle ensued, and the officer 
maced the defendant three times to subdue her.186 
The court admitted that the officer may have had probable cause to believe the 
defendant committed battery against her neighbors and could have accordingly 
arrested her without an arrest warrant.187 But the court found the arrest unlawful 
because it was not initiated in a public place and there were no exigent 
circumstances.188 The court stated the rule that “absent consent, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that even when probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists, 
an officer may only enter a defendant’s home to make the arrest when exigent 
circumstances exist that make it impracticable to obtain a warrant first.”189 The 
court distinguished Santana on the grounds that the police caused the defendant in 
Adkisson to appear in the doorway and the officer did not inform the defendant that 
she was under arrest until the officer was inside the apartment.190  
In Johnson v. State,191 the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for 
resisting arrest because the defendant came to his doorway on his own, and the 
officers initiated the arrest in the doorway. The first time a police officer knocked 
on the defendant’s trailer door to issue a dog restraint citation, the defendant 
answered, colorfully192 refused the citation, and then slammed the door.193 The 
officer returned to his cruiser and called for backup.194 While waiting for backup to 
arrive, the defendant’s wife signaled for the officer to come to the porch.195 When 
the officer was back on the porch, the defendant opened the door and began 
haranguing him while he was explaining the citation to the defendant’s wife.196 The 
officer tried to arrest the defendant in his doorway for disorderly conduct, but the 
defendant retreated inside the trailer.197 The officer followed and a scuffle 
ensued.198  
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The court in Johnson distinguished Adkisson in order to uphold the conviction 
for resisting arrest on four grounds: first, in Adkisson, the defendant remained in 
her home, and in Johnson, the defendant was in his doorway; second, the officer in 
Johnson did not bring the defendant to the doorway by knocking the second time 
he was on the porch; third, the defendant in Johnson engaged himself in a public 
confrontation with the officer by interrupting his attempts to explain the citation to 
the defendant’s wife; and fourth, the officer in Johnson was invited to the porch by 
the defendant’s wife.199 Because the officer initiated the arrest in the doorway, he 
was in hot pursuit when he followed the defendant inside.200 Therefore, the general 
rule announced in Williams—a citizen cannot use force to resist a peaceful public 
arrest, regardless of whether it is a lawful one—was controlling.201 
D. Defining Reasonable Resistance 
In Robinson v. State,202 the Indiana Court of Appeals considered for the first 
time how much resistance is reasonable to prevent an unlawful home entry. When 
the police arrived to check on a possible domestic disturbance on a tip from a 
telemarketer, the defendant met them outside on his porch.203 After the defendant 
informed the officers that their services were not needed, an officer tried to walk 
around the defendant to enter his house.204 The defendant pushed him off the porch, 
initiating a fight and eventually a conviction for battery on a law enforcement 
officer.205 
The State could not prove that a violent crime occurred or that an exigent 
circumstance existed; therefore, the officer was not acting within the scope of his 
duty when he tried to enter the defendant’s residence.206 Nonetheless, the court 
affirmed the defendant’s battery conviction.207 The court held “[t]he right to 
reasonably resist an unlawful entry does not include the right to commit a battery 
upon a police officer.”208 The court reasoned that “the right of reasonable resistance 
to an unlawful entry by police officers has only been extended to force used to 
resist efforts to push open a door to gain entry.”209  
The Robinson facts presented an interesting scenario for the court. The 
defendant was in a public place when he resisted the unlawful entry into his home. 
The defendant was neither resisting a public arrest, as in Fields, nor resisting an 
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entry from inside his home, as in Adkisson. The court could have found Robinson 
analogous to either line of cases or created a new rule for the hybrid scenario. The 
court’s broad holding, which presumably affected the Adkisson line of cases and 
applied to resistance from inside the home, changed the root of the analysis from 
where the homeowner resists to how the homeowner resists. 
E. Bringing It All Together  
The Indiana Court of Appeals outlined the boundaries of the law of resisting 
unlawful entry when it upheld a conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer 
in Masotto v. State.210 Officers were summoned to the defendant’s apartment on 
three separate occasions in one night for noise complaints.211 On the third visit, 
another resident of the apartment invited the officers inside.212 The defendant, who 
was under her bedcovers in her room, would not turn her stereo down or produce 
identification so the officers could issue a citation.213 The officer-in-charge decided 
to return the following day to issue the citation.214 When the officers were on their 
way out the door, the defendant, who had by this time emerged from her room 
completely naked, shoved the last officer in line and closed the door on his heel.215 
The officers arrested the defendant for battery.216 
Masotto appealed her conviction, and the court distinguished the facts in her 
case from precedent: 
Even accepting Masotto’s argument that the officers acted unlawfully 
when they entered her apartment, this does not excuse her actions. The 
officers did not attempt a forceful entry; they were invited in by 
Vasquez. In addition, Masotto was not resisting the officer’s entry or 
her arrest; her actions can most generously be characterized as assisting 
their departure. Such a parting shot falls squarely within the boundaries 
of the conduct the battery on a law enforcement officer statute seeks to 
prevent.217 
The court’s reasoning suggests that even after Robinson, resistance amounting to 
battery might be justified to prevent an unlawful police entry, as long as the 
defendant resists the officers at the door. 
In the Barnes cases the Indiana Supreme Court could have reconciled the two 
branches of precedent. Robinson presented the closest fact pattern to Barnes.218 
Like Robinson, Barnes was not resisting a public arrest;219 therefore the Fields rule 
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did not apply.220 But Barnes, unlike Robinson, retreated into his home before he 
resisted.221 Barnes met the police outside, so his case was not clearly analogous to 
the cases in which the defendant answered the police knock with force.222 The 
Indiana Supreme Court did not recognize these differences in either opinion. On its 
face, the legislature’s revised statute does not provide for these subtleties.  
IV. A REASONABLE DEFINITION 
In accordance with Indiana precedent and the Fourth Amendment privacy roots, 
the Indiana Supreme Court in Barnes should have followed the line drawn by the 
United States Supreme Court in Payton. That is, the court should have “drawn a 
firm line at the entrance to the house.”223 The court will eventually have an 
opportunity to interpret what the Indiana General Assembly meant when it 
provided in the revised statute that Hoosiers can use “reasonable force” to prevent 
unlawful home entries. When it does, the court should adopt a rule for reasonable 
force as follows:  
A person has the right to use reasonable force to resist what the person 
reasonably believes is unlawful police entry if:  
(1) the person is already inside his home when the police announce 
their presence at the door.  
(a) Reasonable force is that which is necessary to keep the door 
closed, but does not amount to deadly force.  
(b) Reasonable force includes battery against a police officer if 
the officer crosses the threshold of the doorway without invitation 
or exigent circumstance.  
(2) A person who answers the police knock at his door is entitled to 
close the door, and the officer assumes the risk of injury if he inserts 
an appendage into the doorway. 
(3) If, however, a person is outside of the threshold of his doorway 
when the police arrive and announce their presence, the person may 
retreat into his home, but he may not match the officer’s force if the 
officer tries to prevent his retreat from outside the threshold of the 
doorway.  
It is for the jury to determine the conditions of the resistance. 
This rule combines the two prominent strands of Indiana precedent: resisting 
arrest in public and resisting entry from inside the home. Therefore, when the 
police apprehend a subject outside of his home, in public view, the “modern rule” 
of Fields applies: a person cannot use force to resist a public arrest, regardless of 
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the legality of the arrest.224 When the police meet a person inside his home, the 
Casselman rule applies: a person may reasonably resist an unlawful entry.225  
This interpretation is especially useful in determining the outcome of cases that 
do not clearly fit in either the public arrest or home entry category, cases like 
Robinson,226 Masotto,227 and Barnes.228 The rule also addresses the scenario most 
likely covered by the revised statute: all instances of unlawful police entry that do 
not meet the narrow two-part test for deadly force.229 A clear definition will prevent 
unnecessary excessive violence that might result from homeowners deciding how 
much resistance is reasonable. 
If this rule was the law before Barnes, Barnes’s conviction would depend on a 
different jury determination on remand. The Indiana Court of Appeals found that 
the officer’s attempted warrantless entry into Barnes’s apartment was unlawful 
because there was no consent or exigent circumstance.230 The court reversed and 
remanded so that the jury could determine whether Barnes’s resistance was 
reasonable resistance or battery.231 Under this proposed rule, the case would have 
been remanded for the jury not to determine whether the nature of the resistance 
was reasonable, but to determine whether the resistance was initiated inside or 
outside the threshold of the doorway.  
The opinions are not entirely clear about where Barnes was standing when he 
shoved the officer into the hallway or if the officers tried to restrain Barnes before 
he entered his apartment.232 If the jury were to find that Barnes was already inside 
his apartment before the officer tried to enter, and the officers did not try to restrain 
Barnes before he entered his apartment, Barnes’s resistance would be reasonable 
force used to resist the unlawful police entry. His conviction would be reversed. If, 
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however, the jury were to find that the officers initiated their restraint before Barnes 
entered his apartment, then the resistance was unreasonable, and Barnes’s 
conviction would stand. 
The question of what is “reasonable force” will soon be back on the dockets of 
the Indiana appellate courts. This Note proposes an interpretation of the revised 
statute that will discourage police from violating citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights by entering their residence without a warrant or exigent circumstances. The 
interpretation provides a bright-line rule for citizens and police: the doorway. With 
a bright-line understanding of where and how resistance is considered “reasonable 
force,” the risk of violence against police officers and homeowners is minimized. It 
gives the legislature’s reaffirmation of “the long standing right of a citizen to 
protect his or her home against unlawful intrusion”233 actual meaning.  
The exclusionary rule is also designed to deter police misconduct, but by its 
nature it cannot adequately protect an individual’s privacy interest. The doorway 
should be the final bastion of privacy. This rule should encourage police 
departments to adopt policies that favor the acquisition of warrants. The Barnes 
rule encourages police department policies that circumvent the warrant 
requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Indiana common law favors maintaining the right of Hoosiers to resist unlawful 
police entry with force. The legislature was correct to codify this right. The Barnes 
rule, which purports to keep the right to reasonably resist intact but makes battery 
unreasonable resistance, will undermine the right to resist. The legislature should 
have defined “reasonable force.” Resistance without battery is not reasonable 
resistance. A better interpretation of the revised statute draws a clear line at the 
door, where resistance is reasonable from inside, but unreasonable from outside.  
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